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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 64 FALL 1989 NUMBER 1
TOWARD MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
LAWYERING: FURTHER THOUGHTS ON
THE DEONTOLOGICAL MODEL OF
LEGAL ETHICS
EDWARD J. EBERLE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the epic battle over the Kutak Commission's promulga-
tion of a new code of lawyers' ethics,' the legal profession has un-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University. This Article was written pri-
marily while a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at New England School of Law, and I
wish to acknowledge their support. I would like to thank Professors Anthony D'Amato of
Northwestern, Geoffrey Hazard of Yale, and Richard Huber of Boston College, and Mary
Shacklett, all of whom reviewed earlier drafts of this Article, for their many useful com-
ments. I would also like to acknowledge the seminal influence in differing ways of two im-
portant recent articles-Stephen Pepper's The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A
Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 and Deborah Rode's Ethi-
cal Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985). Finally, and very impor-
tantly, I would like to thank Pat Gresham and PJ Jorgensen for their very able assistance,
and good will and cheer, in helping prepare this Article. I alone am of course responsible for
all remaining errors and shortcomings.
' The ABA formed the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards in 1977
and assigned it the task of "a comprehensive rethinking of the ethical premises and
problems of the profession of law." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Chairman's
Introduction (Proposed Final Draft 1981) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. The Kutak Commis-
sion, named after its chairman, Robert Kutak, promulgated a new code of ethics, the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Model Rules"), which the ABA adopted. The process
of promulgating and adopting a new code of ethics involved numerous meetings, widespread
public comment and published commentary, and significant redrafting, rethinking, and revi-
sion. See Armstrong, Retrospect and Prospect: The Kutak Commission Report, 11 CAP.
U.L. REv. 475, 486 (1982) (account of events leading to creation of commission). Several
provisions of the Model Rules were very controversial. Dissatisfied with the Model Rules,
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America proposed an alternative code. See AMERICAN
TRIAL LAWS. ASS'N, THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT, reprinted in SELECTED
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dergone serious and sustained reflection over its course, practice
and ethics. The ensuing literature has been vast and insightful. Ex-
cellent empirical data have helped paint a vivid portrait of the
working professional.2 Further justifications of the mainstream au-
tonomy model of the practicing bar have been crafted.' Moral phi-
losophers have continued to critique this mainstream paradigm.4
Others have faulted moral philosophers for critiquing without ade-
quately understanding the practicing bar's actual concerns, condi-
tions, and attitudes.5 Still others have attempted nothing less than
a fundamental rethinking of the profession, including the role eth-
ics should play in contemporary practice.
The focus of all this scholarly work continues to be the main-
stream autonomy model of the practicing bar, which views the law-
yer as a facilitator of the client's autonomy within the legal system.
An attorney's fidelity to the client serves the fundamental interests
STATUTES, RULES AND STANDARDS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 364-68 (1989) [hereinafter
AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE]. Many are still dissatisfied with the end product.
2 See, e.g., J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE
BAR 3-17 (1982) (systematic study of character of Chicago bar); F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM,
THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION 5-12 (1981) (examining law school's role in develop-
ment of lawyers and legal profession); Heinz, The Power of Lawyers, 17 GA. L. REV. 891,905
(1983) (focuses on client influences and concludes "autonomy of lawyers as individuals or as
firms may be greatly overrated"); Heinz & Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client Inter-
ests, Professional Roles, and Social Hierarchies, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1978) ("the
legal profession is, to a great degree, externally oriented, and in consequence is shared and
structured by its clients"); Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social
Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504 (1985)
(examines relationship between practice in large firms and their political, legal, and profes-
sional attitudes).
I See Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some
Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 634 (suggesting "the moral values of auton-
omy and equality are imperative in relation to access to the law"); Fried, The Lawyer as
Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1066
(1976) ("it is not only legally but also morally right that a lawyer adopt as his dominant
purpose the furthering of his client's interests"); see also FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 24 (1975) (defending zealous advocacy of client interest as a "precious
safeguard.., against a hostile world"). Pepper's piece follows and elaborates on the classic
justifications of the autonomy model of professions.
See Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 639.
1 See Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984
Wis. L. REV. 1529, 1532 (philosophers tend to rely on "dubious empirical claims about law
practice and legal ethics as body of lawyers' thought").
' See Rhode & Schwartz, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589,
651 (1985) ("the profession must create more opportunities for normative interchange not
only in law schools, but also in law firms and bar associations").
DEONTOLOGICAL MODEL
of individual dignity, autonomy, equality, and privacy.' By serving
these interests, lawyers, invisibly and perhaps unwittingly, serve
society at large.
The plausibility of the autonomy model depends, however, on
acceptance of a kind of moral insulation which allows lawyers to
facilitate their clients' interests to the exclusion of most other con-
cerns, including those of morality, society, or another individual.
Lawyering on behalf of clients' autonomy should indeed occur
within the bounds of the law. But within those bounds lawyers
tend to represent their clients zealously, without considering the
means or ends of their representation and without recognizing fun-
damental responsibility for their actions, except insofar as they aid
and abet their clients in accomplishing their objectives. By acting
as professionals, lawyers are seemingly privileged to operate in this
moral vacuum, detached from society and its general ethical
norms.
The important, and intriguing, question raised by the auton-
omy model is the extent to which an attorney, acting in a profes-
sional role, can (or should) be insulated from moral norms. s Under
current legal practice, lawyers may easily retreat to an amoral pro-
fessional role in the face of normative conflict. But should lawyers
be excused from any (or all) personal responsibility for their pro-
fessional actions? Indeed, should professional rules of conduct pro-
hibit lawyers from exercising personal responsibility for their pro-
fessional actions? 9 At a minimum, the extent to which the
professional role preempts personal responsibility calls for close
7 See supra note 3.
8 See, e.g., infra note 86 and accompanying text. Whether lawyers should be excused
from moral accountability for their actions is not a novel issue. See, e.g., Postema, Moral
Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 63 (1980)("lawyers .. . claim
special warrant for engaging in some activities which, were they performed by others, would
be likely to draw moral censure"); Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Is-
sues, 5 Huzi. RTs. 1, 5 (1975) ("What is characteristic of this role of a lawyer is the lawyer's
required indifference to a wide variety of ends and consequences that in other contexts
would be of undeniable moral significance").
I See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs, supra note 1, Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1983). Rule 1.6(b)(1) states: "A
lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm." Accordingly, this rule would prohibit
a lawyer from disclosing a client's intention to commit an economic crime, such as securities
fraud. For a rationale of the underlying policies of the confidentiality rule, see Schaffer,
Christian Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 721, 724-25 (1975).
See generally Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1061 (1978); Popkin, Client-Lawyer Confidentiality, 59 Tax. L. REV. 755 (1981).
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scrutiny.
Lawyers, like the rest of society, should not be beyond the
reach of morality in most contemporary practice situations. Like
other members of society, lawyers should confront, and be account-
able for the ethical dimensions of their judgments and actions.
This Article re-examines an alternative approach to legal ethics,
the deontological model, which provides a means of bringing cur-
rent professional rules of conduct into better congruity with moral
norms. 10 It is the purpose of this Article to elaborate on this deon-
tological model of legal ethics.
The impetus behind the deontological model is easily ex-
plained. Current professional practices undervalue relevant moral
considerations in relation to the admittedly important client inter-
ests of dignity, autonomy, equality, and privacy-the "autonomy"
interests." Three interrelated factors cause this undervaluation of
moral concerns. The first is the dominant "autonomy" model of
legal ethics, discussed above. The second is the so-called "pa-
tronage alliance," that is, the alliance existing between mainly
higher status or resource elements of society and elite corporate
lawyers. The third factor is the modern legal realist view of law
that urges lawyers to see "law" in instrumental terms, as a tool to
promote client autonomy interests. Together, these factors operate
to undervalue, if not completely devalue, relevant moral considera-
tions. This moral dilemma of modern practice, and each of its con-
tributing factors, will be described more fully in section two of this
Article.
For the sake of the working professional, and the legal profes-
sion, it is important to resolve this moral dilemma in a manner
which is more ethically satisfying. To this end, this Article will
elaborate on the deontological model of legal ethics and demon-
strate how it can better account for the moral considerations rele-
vant to the attorney-client decision-making process. The model is
not intended to "tilt" decisions in favor of moral considerations,
nor is it designed to encourage lawyers to superimpose their moral
standards on clients and thereby form an "oligarchy of lawyers.' 2
'o The term "deontological" is one which Professor D'Amato and I have previously used
to refer to a model of legal ethics which recognizes that "some acts are morally obligatory
regardless of their consequences for human happiness." D'Amato & Eberle, Three Models of
Legal Ethics, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 761, 772-73 (1983).
See id. at 764-65.
12 See Wasserstrom, supra note 8, at 11.
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Rather, its purpose is to incorporate more effectively moral consid-
erations into the rendering of legal advice so that they become in-
herently relevant to the formulation of such advice, in contrast to
the autonomy model approach. In any situation, while a relevant
moral consideration may or may not predominate, it should always
be evaluated along with other relevant considerations, such as au-
tonomy interests, to determine which values should ultimately
guide the structuring of advice and conduct.
The argument, then, is simply that there is an appropriate
place for moral concerns in practice, and lawyers should not be shy
about raising them when relevant. The deontological model elabo-
rated here offers a more rigorous ethical framework for evaluating
contemporary questions of professional responsibility by assuring
that moral considerations are adequately taken into account, along
with the concerns of client autonomy, dignity, and equality.
Like any model of legal ethics, the deontological model cannot
be effective if addressed to a world of ideals and angels. It must
address our very real world of imperfect justice, hard-headed and
hard working attorneys, and difficult moral choices. Therefore, this
Article will first examine the portrait of the contemporary bar as
depicted in recent empirical literature. This examination is neces-
sary to understand better the actual concerns, conditions, and atti-
tudes of the practicing bar. 13 This section will primarily examine
American private law-the body of law governing relations be-
tween essentially private, nonpublic parties-with a focus on cor-
porate practice, the most powerful, populous, and influential seg-
ment of this sphere. Drawing on moral philosophy, this Article will
then sketch, in section three, the philosophical foundations of the
deontological model, based upon the work of Kant, Ross, and
Rawls. Section four will demonstrate how the deontological model
can indeed function by applying it to contemporary practice situa-
tions. In section five, a method will be suggested as to how the
deontological model may provide a better means for bringing con-
temporary practices into closer congruity with moral norms. In
13 See Rhode & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 643. Understanding the reality of the work-
ing bar is a necessary precondition to formulating (or reformulating) rules of ethical behav-
ior. Lawyers "must confront the consequences of their decisions," and rules of professional
conduct must be formulated "against a realistic social backdrop." Id. There has recently
been a wealth of excellent empirical data regarding the attitudes, practices, and customs of
practicing attorneys in contemporary America. See supra note 2; F. ZEMANS & V. ROSEN-
BLUM, supra note 2, at 172-73, 176, 179-84, 187.
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particular, the deontological model can be useful in helping to
identify and resolve moral choices and conflicts in modern prac-
tice.' 4 Finally, in section six, this Article will offer a proposal for
codification of the deontological approach. The goal is to show how
a dimension can exist for a responsible, ethical view of lawyering in
the context of a capitalist society.
II. PORTRAIT OF THE CONTEMPORARY BAR
The portrait of the contemporary bar depicted in recent em-
pirical literature removes some of the myth surrounding American
legal practice by revealing a growing gap between attorneys' self-
image of autonomy and their actual dependence on clients. Law-
yers adhere to an ideology of professional autonomy in their pro-
fessional role with clients, which has little relation to actual prac-
tice. 5 In practice, clients dominate the activities of lawyers. Far
from being autonomous, lawyers are, in fact, dependent on their
clients for reputation, prestige, and wealth.16
Clients' dominance of their attorneys has significant conse-
quences for contemporary professional practice. First, lawyers do
not now (if they ever effectively did) serve as mediators between
the needs of their clients and society. In contrast to earlier socio-
logical thought, lawyers do not preserve or enhance the workings of
society by resolving conflicts or drawing disparate elements to-
gether.17 Nor do they typically display any "collectivity orienta-
tion, '  or subscribe to Justice Brandeis' "counsel for the situa-
tion" ethic, by which attorneys seek to bring disputing parties
' F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, supra note 2, at 172-73, 187.
16 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 504-05.
See id. at 528.
17 See Heinz, supra note 2, at 892-93. The sociological reference is to a group of sociolo-
gists known as the "functionalist school," the most prominent of which was Talcott Parsons.
Id.; see also Nelson, supra note 2, at 505 (large-firm lawyers do not serve mediating function
in legal system; instead, approach to issues is "ultimately ... determined by the positions of
their clients"). But see Schneyer, supra note 5, at 1546 (lawyers do act as mediators).
Schneyer's work, among others, demonstrates that a portion of the bar (generally those in
the personal client sector) does at times perform a "mediating" function. Id. However, I
believe that lawyers, especially corporate lawyers, do not tend to perform such a function,
but instead focus predominantly on the interests of their clients and themselves, to the
exclusion of competing concerns.
18 But see Heinz, supra note 2, at 893. "Parsons argued that professionals are charac-
terized by a 'collectivity orientation.' " Id. (citing T. PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 434-36
(1951)) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 64:1:1
DEONTOLOGICAL MODEL
together to achieve a fair result.19 To the contrary, the data suggest
not only that lawyers seldom change their clients' goals, but that
they do not even attempt to mediate those goals when such goals
may be at odds with social norms.2 0 Second, lawyers focus on maxi-
mizing their clients' interests, and not on mediating them with the
disparate interests society may have as a whole.2 Since lawyers are
dependent on their clients for reputation, prestige, and wealth, it
stands to reason that most lawyers will perceive maximization of
their clients' welfare as the clearest path to success. Thus, lawyers'
self-interest lies in promoting their clients' self-interest. Third, this
mutuality of self-interest does not arise simply from a desire to
pursue wealth or power. Complex economic, social, and ideological
dynamics are responsible for lawyers sharing clients' interests,22
and it is a mischaracterization of the range of forces at work to
attribute this mutual self-interest to the "lawyers' feeble moral fi-
ber or crass material preoccupation. 23 This system of mutual self-
interest and interdependence has been called the "patronage alli-
ance or organization. ''24
In this context, it is not surprising that most attorneys do not
wrestle with their clients over fundamental moral questions, and
rarely disagree with the broader implications of their clients' con-
duct.25 There are three primary reasons for this "amoral" role.
First, most work that lawyers perform is highly technical. Second,
there tends to be a congruence of values between attorneys and
their clients. Attorneys either have a similarity of values with their
clients, or they tend to adopt the values of the clients they re-
present.26 In large firms, clients have greater wealth and power
" See Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683, 702 (1965).
20 See J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note 2, at 368-73; Nelson, supra note 2, at 544-45;
see also Rhode & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 629 (strong coincidence in attitudes between
counsel and clients).
21 Nelson, supra note 2, at 538.
22 See Rhode & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 629 ("economic, social, and ideological forces
converge to cement a patronage alliance" which displaces normative decision making).
23 Schneyer, supra note 5, at 1543, 1571 (common financial, psychological, and organi-
zational pressures of law practice, rather than permissive ethics rules, explain lawyers' ten-
dency to resolve moral conflicts in favor of client).
214 Heinz, supra note 2, at 898-99.
25 Nelson, supra note 2, at 538.
26 Studies involving broad segments of the lawyer population, ranging from large corpo-
rate practice to small firms and solo practitioners, indicate that attorneys strive to maximize
their clients' self-interest, and thereby take on the values of their clients in the process. See
J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note 2, at 360-65; Heinz, supra note 2, at 898-99.
1989]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
than their attorneys, and the lawyers are dependent on a few large
clients for their revenues. Small firms and solo practitioners, what
may be termed "personal sector lawyers, ' 7 usually represent par-
ties on the lower end of the socio-economic scale against individu-
als and organizations of generally greater status and resources. As
a result, personal sector lawyers are typically less beholden to indi-
vidual clients for their revenues. However, the "patronage alliance"
often extends beyond the personal sector lawyers' client base to
higher status parties, such as judges, bureaucrats, or insurance
claims adjustors. Thus, in either context, social or moral questions
simply do not arise, since lawyers are likely to acquiesce to the
demands of their respective patronage alliance.28
Third, the pervasive climate of "modern" legal realism that
marks contemporary professional education, training, and practice
operates to transform potentially troublesome value questions into
professional matters of technique and strategy. Lawyers thus have
little inclination to inject normative concerns into their practice.29
The perception that the bar, especially the legal elite, has al-
lied itself with business is not new.30 What is new is the recognition
of the depth of that alliance and its apparent transformative effect
on lawyers' values. Lawyers perform the bulk of their services for
27 Heinz and Laumann call lawyers who serve persons, as compared with corporations,
"personal sector lawyers." Heinz, supra note 2, at 898-99. Lawyers serving corporate clients
comprise the "corporate" sector of practice. Id. (summarizing results reported in J. HEINz &
E. LAUMANN, supra note 2, at 360-65).
28 See id. at 899-900. In the personal client sector, the "patronage alliance" seems to
extend beyond the client base to a range of higher status elements of society, such as
"judges, court clerks, insurance claims adjustors, bail bondsmen and local bureaucrats." Id.;
see J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note 2, at 364. In this way, lawyers in the personal client
sector may be subject to more intense pressure than their corporate sector counterparts,
since they have more masters to serve. Heinz, supra note 2, at 899-900. However, personal
client sector lawyers generally remain independent of their clients, even if constrained by
other actors with whom they deal in the course of their practice. See J. HEINZ & E.
LAUMANN, supra note 2, at 364. Thus, personal sector attorneys may be free from the con-
trols of their clients, but answerable to other patronage callings necessitated by the nature
of their practice. Id.
29 See Pepper, supra note 3, at 625-26.
20 See L. BRANDEIS, THE OPPORTUNITY IN THE LAW BUSINESS - A PROFESSION 313, 321
(1914) ("able lawyers have, to a large extent, allowed themselves to become adjuncts of great
corporations and have neglected the obligation to use their powers for the protection of the
people"); see also A. A. Berle, Jr.: Modern Legal Profession, 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE Soc.
Sc. 340, 342 (1933) (corporate firms "have contributed little to legal literature, social re-
sponsibility or public leadership; but they have been highly profitable and have safeguarded
the position of the new business organizations").
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corporations or other organizations. 1 Most of these lawyers no
longer view themselves primarily as officers of the court, mediators
of justice, or other traditional ideals of the bar. Instead, many see
themselves as technicians with a simple desire to conduct law prac-
tice as a business according to the morals of the marketplace.32 If
at one time there was a debate as to whether the practice of law
would remain a profession or become a business, there is little ar-
gument now: modern law practice, particularly corporate law prac-
tice, is primarily a business, run as any other business. Pressures to
produce, within organizational structures, and to accommodate cli-
ents play pervasive roles in the daily lives of lawyers, at significant
personal and social cost.33
The above portrait of the contemporary bar takes place within
the current climate of "modern" legal realism. Much recent com-
mentary has spelled out the view that law is vague and changeable,
not precise, certain, clear-cut, or always predictable, but rather
that law is instrumental and manipulative, not normative.3 4
31 That is the conclusion of one seminal study. See Heinz & Laumann, The Organiza-
tion of Lawyers' Work: Size, Intensity, and Co-Practice of the Fields of Law, 1979 AM. B.
FOUND. RES J. 217, 225 (47% of total legal effort is performed for corporate clients). Profes-
sor Rhode notes that 95% of recent entrants into the law provide services to some kind of
organization rather than to individuals. Rhode & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 590.
32 See Rhode & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 592-93; Stewart, Professional Ethics for the
Business Lawyer: The Morals of the Marketplace, 31 Bus. LAw. 463, 467 (1975) ("the ethics
of the business lawyer are, indeed, and perhaps should be, no more than the morals of the
marketplace").
33 Indicative of the business-oriented nature of modern legal practice are the comments
by American Bar Association President Morris Harrell, who has expressed concern that
firms may reduce continuing legal education for associates because such programs have be-
come economically undesirable. See Harrell, Preserving Professionalism, 69 A.B.A. J. 864,
864 (1983).
34 See Pepper, supra note 3, at 624-26. My choice of the phrase "legal realism" is influ-
enced by, and attributable to Professor Pepper in the manner he describes it. Id at 624 n.42.
Pepper chose "legal realism" as a term to describe modern law because it "derives from a
perception that it will have the highest recognition level as descriptive of 'the dominant
view of law inculcated in the law school.'" I use "modern" legal realism simply to distin-
guish it from "classical" legal realism as developed by Frank, Llewellyn and Pound. See,
e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 46-52 (1930); Llewellyn, Some Realism About
Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1222, 1248-55 (1931); Pound, The
Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. REV. 697, 710-11 (1931). Pepper cites much of
the key "modern" legal realist literature. See, e.g., F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, supra note
2, at 191-92; Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 247, 248-52 (1978); Cramton, Beyond the Ordinary Religion, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 509,
513 (1987); Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 1656, 1691 (1986); Woodard, The
Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 VA. L. REv. 689, 728-32 (1968); For
an important critique of legal realism, see D'Amato, The Limits of Legal Realism, 87 Yale
L.J. 468 passim (1978).
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As a "scientific" description of law, the modern legal realist
view can be seen as essentially accurate. For it realistically de-
scribes law as complex-that law "cannot be reduced to a simple
set of rules," or "mechanical determinacy."' 6 Rather, law "relies on
a collection of shared values, assumptions and techniques,"36 which
Thomas Kuhn classically described as science.17 From this perspec-
tive, the "modern" legal realist view comprises one set of assump-
tions and techniques making up "law," or in Kuhn's language a
"paradigm." In Kuhnsian terms, "modern" legal realism can thus
be viewed as only one of the several competing paradigms at work
in the formulation of "law," but it is probably the "dominant" par-
adigm. Likewise, the autonomy model of legal ethics is one para-
digm within which to view legal ethics, but it is also currently the
dominant paradigm. However, there are competing paradigms at
work in law (and legal ethics) from which eventually a more settled
Weltanschauung, or world view, may emerge.
However, mixing the autonomy model of legal ethics with the
modern legal realist view of law can provide a noxious cocktail. It
means that lawyers intent on realizing their clients' total autonomy
can view law as a malleable commodity to be used, bent, or
manipulated as needed to achieve client goals. This is the "morally
pernicious effect" of legal realism. 8 All of this occurs within the
bounds of the law, to be sure, but only by redefining and stretching
the limits of the law to accommodate client autonomy interests,
thus redefining society itself in the process. This process operates
to transform or redefine the terms and meaning of law so that law
can take on concrete value in promoting autonomy interests.
The dominant "modern" legal realist view of law, combined
with the traditional amoral role of the lawyer, and the "patronage
alliance" between lawyer and client, posits the moral dilemma of
contemporary American legal practice: law is essentially neutral
and can seemingly be viewed as conveying no moral force while
lawyers view their function as primarily technical and instrumental
and not one of imparting normative guidance. Moreover, since law-
yers aim to please their clients, they naturally perceive their suc-
" See Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1335
n.24 (1988); Luban, supra note 34, at 1691.
3' See Farber, supra note 35, at 1335 n.24; Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason and the
First Amendment, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1615, 1629-31 (1987).
' T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10, 24 (1962).
SB Luban, supra note 4, at 646.
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cess as dependent on satisfaction of this goal. Thus, neither the
law nor lawyers seem to be much of a source of morality insofar as
both work, or can be put to work, to realize client autonomy.
Professor Pepper has outlined this modern moral dilemma
well: clients seeking access to the law frequently have "weak inter-
nal or external sources of morality," while lawyers advising them
view their professional role not as one of imposing moral con-
straints on clients' desires, but rather understand and interpret the
law to deemphasize its moral content and perceive it primarily as a
manipulative instrumentality.39 To realize their clients' goals
within this legal structure, lawyers "systematically screen out or
deemphasize moral considerations and moral limits. °4 0 It is hardly
surprising, then, that lawyers mainly guide clients so as to maxi-
mize their autonomy without regard to the ends or consequences of
client conduct, or the means used to accomplish those ends, or
their own conduct insofar as they promote autonomy interests.
Such an approach allows attorneys to promote client autonomy
while still acting within the "bounds of the law."
In this way, contemporary law practice tends to undervalue
moral concerns. The normative uncertainty of the law, combined
with lawyers' agnosticism and dependence on clients, results in
lawyers' propensity to resolve most doubts in favor of their cli-
ents, 1 just as Professor Llewellyn observed decades ago. 2 This is
the social and moral cost of the autonomy model, which practition-
ers themselves recognize and grapple with. 3 Carried to its logical
extreme, this form of moral agnosticism-the desire to do business
according to the morals of the marketplace-means that normative
judgment can be suspended in favor of clients, clients' means, cli-
ents' ends, clients' goals, and lawyers' own personal actions in aid-
ing and abetting these autonomy interests. Without a mediating
function performed by law, lawyers, or society, there is nothing to
arbitrate client autonomy interests. Autonomy interests may then
be fulfilled to the fullest in the market economy.
There is obviously much in this portrait that is disturbing, at
' See Pepper, supra note 3, at 627.
40 Id.
" See J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, supra note 2, at 1137; Rhode & Schwartz, supra note 6,
at 629.
12 Llewellyn, "The Bar Specializes-with what Results?", 169 ANNAL 177, 181-82
(1933).
41 F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, supra note 2, at 172-73, 178-81.
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least to some. But so long as legal services are distributed through
a market system, as are other services and products in our econ-
omy, there exists little prospect for fundamental change. It seems
inevitable that lawyers will align themselves with their business in-
terests and, in the process, echo the values of their clients. In this
context, the focus of legal reform efforts must lie in ameliorating
market failures or other anomalies resulting from the dominant au-
tonomy model. As we approach the end of the millennium, efforts
designed to make current practices more congruent with moral
norms seem to be the most realistic course for attempting to solve
the moral dilemma of modern practice caused by the dominant au-
tonomy model.
Since current private legal practice tends to confine moral vi-
sion, a more ethically rigorous framework for approaching ques-
tions of professional responsibility is needed, if for no other reason
than to make lawyers more sensitive to the normative dimensions
of their advice, decisions, and conduct. Even practicing lawyers
perceive a need to strike a better balance between client interests
and moral values in modern practice.44 This Article now turns to
an articulation of a moral vision, namely the deontological model.
III. THE DEONTOLOGICAL MODEL
This section will outline the philosophical foundations of the
deontological model so that its application to contemporary prac-
tice situations-which will be illustrated in section four-will be
more sensible. The goal is to show that the deontological model is
far easier to grasp, and to apply, than its name would suggest.
"A deontological theory of ethics says that some acts are mor-
ally obligatory regardless of their consequences.''41 It is an ethical
theory that is opposed to utilitarianism. For example, Peter would
have no moral right to rob Paul even if Peter's intention would be
to use Paul's money to buy food for the homeless. A lawyer would
likewise have no moral right to misrepresent a material fact to a
bank so that a client, a shelter for the homeless, could obtain a
" Id. at 180-81. The authors report that 30.6% of practitioners responding to one sur-
vey stressed that a " 'sense of social responsibility,' ... 'humanity,' and standards 'above the
current morality of the marketplace'" be included in professional responsibility courses in
law school. Id. at 180. The practitioners surveyed were using "moral" in a much broader
sense than used in this article.
" D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 10, at 772 (citing W. FRANKENA, ETHICS 16-17 (2d ed.
1973)).
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needed loan. These acts are wrong, even though they serve greater,
and morally worthwhile ends.
The leading philosopher of deontological ethics, Immanuel
Kant, formulated a basic moral command, the categorical impera-
tive, against which all individual actions would be judged. Accord-
ing to Kant, only those maxims which a rational being could con-
ceive as valid bases of action for all other rational beings are moral.
He stated the categorical imperative as follows: "Act only accord-
ing to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law.""' Kant expressed the classic a pri-
ori and categorical approach.
The underlying dynamic in Kant's theory applicable to legal
ethics is the power of critical reasoning. People must critically rea-
son, first, to identify moral values, then to formulate ethical princi-
ples based on those moral values by which to justify their actions.
Kant's reasoning is, of course, far more technical. In moral
philosophy, Kant "wishes to discover the origin in the practical
reason of the fundamental principles according to which we all
judge when we judge morally."47 The moral philosopher should
"lay bare the a priori element freeing it from all empirically de-
rived elements, and ... show its origin in the practical reason. "48
Reason must be used to accomplish these goals, and Kant en-
visioned two uses for reason. One form of reasoning is concerned
with theoretical knowledge-with isolating the a priori elements in
our knowledge in the manner described above. Kant calls this
"pure practical reasoli." The other form of reasoning is concerned
with choice-"the production of moral choices or decisions in ac-
cordance with the law which proceeds from itself." This Kant calls
"practical reason." "In plain language, theoretical reason is di-
rected towards knowledge, while practical reason is directed to-
4 1. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39 (L.W. Beck trans. 2d ed.
1959). Kant restated his categorical imperative in four ways: 1) "Act as though the maxim of
your action were by your will to become a universal law of nature," id.; 2) "Act so that you
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and
never as a means only," id. at 47; 3) Act in accord with "the idea of the will of every rational
being as a will giving universal law... (E)verything be done from the maxim of its will as
one which could have as its object only itself considered as giving universal laws," id. at 50;
4) "[A]ct as if [you] by [your] maxims, [are] at all times a legislative member in the univer-
sal realm of ends ... [a]ct as if your maxims should serve at the same time as the universal
law (of all rational beings)." Id. at 57. Each of these formulations is really a restatement of
the basic categorical imperative, and each has the same essential meaning.
17 6 F. COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, pt. IV, at 309 (1960).
48 Id.
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wards choice in accordance with moral law and, when physically
possible, to the implementation of choice in action. '49 Reason thus
forms the basis of obligation that makes for moral choice.
To ground moral law in reason, Kant links "subjective" princi-
ples of volition with "objective" reason. He does this by making a
fundamental distinction between principles and maxims." "[A]
principle [is an axiom] on which all men would act if they were
purely rational moral agents. A maxim is a subjective principle of
volition ... a principle on which an agent acts as a matter of fact
and which determines his decisions." 51 Specific maxims are then
tested against his ultimate criterion, the categorical imperative, in
order to establish fundamental "objective" principles applicable to
all. The categorical imperative demands that one "act only accord-
ing to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law."'52
To test whether a maxim-a person's moral choice-accords
with "rational" moral law we must ask ourselves whether we would
desire that our maxim, i.e, our choice, be a universal law applicable
to all. If so, then our maxim will stand up as a principle (a univer-
sal law). But if not, we must reject the maxim. In either case, it is
the categorical imperative that serves as the ultimate criterion for
judging actions. "[A]ll concrete principles of conduct must partake
in this universality if they are to qualify for being called moral."5
Assuming that each person strives for objective moral good-
ness, critical rational reasoning, in the manner suggested by Kant,
is the only method by which one can obtain that rarefied state.
Critical reasoning, in this technical sense, "seeks to reveal the
moral imperatives imbedded in the structure of normative ration-
,9 Id. at 310.
50 I. KANT, supra note 46, at 38 n.9.
A "maxim" is the subjective principle of acting, and must be distinguished from
the objective principle, i.e., the practical law. The former contains the practical
rule which reason determines according to the conditions of the subject . . . [so
that it is] the principle which the subject acts[; b]ut [t]he law is the objective
principle valid for every rational being, and the principle by which it ought to act,
i.e., an imperative.
Id.
51 6 F. COPLESTON, supra note 47, at 318-19 (emphasis added).
52 I. KANT, supra note 46, at 39. As Professor Copleston explained, the categorical im-
perative "commands . . . that the maxims which serve as our principles of volition should
conform to universal law." 6 F. COPLESTON, supra note 47, at 323.
53 6 F. COPLESTON, supra note 47, at 320.
1, Id. at 324.
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ality.' ' 55 Moral principles are objects of rational choice and define
the moral law which people can rationally utilize to govern their
conduct.56 The goal of this form of reasoning is to universalize, to
formulate fundamental, universal principles of conduct which are
"objectively necessary, without regard to any other end. '57 Using
these principles as guidelines for individual conduct enables one to
behave as a free and rational person;58 that is, in harmony with
universal practical reason, the idea of the will of every rational be-
ing as a will giving universal law.59 In this manner, people may re-
alize moral autonomy; they receive their place, in effect, in Kant's
universal "realm of ends. 60
Kant's general theory of ethics is fundamentally sound. His
universal kingdom of ends, where purely rational beings live ac-
cording to self-imposed universal rules, is probably not a feasible
goal in our "phenomenal" world. In fact, Kant himself believed
that reason had limits and that it was not possible to derive all
moral laws and precepts from reason." Likewise, the categorical
imperative may or may not be directly applicable to our world,
even "as a means for generating rules of conduct or moral
claims. '6 2 Despite this, however, the importance of Kant's theory
for us is as "an ideal toward which the rules of the phenomenal
world can strive, 63 so that our conduct can better achieve moral
worth-if that is our goal. In this way, Kantian critical reasoning
can serve as a means for identifying moral values, resolving moral
choices, and ultimately generating "universal" rules of conduct.
Restated in non-M'etaphysical and secular terms, Kant's form
of reasoning requires that one morally appraise one's action in or-
der to accept the critical principle-the moral value-involved in
the moral appraisal. This is true for both the actor and those af-
fected by the action, and regardless of what was hoped to be ac-
11 Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L.
REv. 885, 913 (1981).
56 See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 251 (1971).
'1 See I. KANT, supra note 46, at 31.
"I See J. RAWLS, supra note 56, at 252.
51 See I. KANT, supra note 46, at 51.
60 Id. Kant describes his realm of ends as "a systematic union of rational beings
through common objective laws ... [which] have in view.., the relation of these beings to
each another as ends and means." Id. at 52.
" See 6 F. COPLESTON, supra note 47, at 205.
6' Mashaw, supra note 55, at 917.
63 Id.
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complished 6 4 This self-evaluation demands an impartial point of
view, so that in formulating conduct one must consider oneself as
both agent and object of action, as actor and subject-as if a "veil
of ignorance" had been imposed.65
But morality is not simply treating others as one would like to
be treated. It is also a matter of not treating others in ways one
would find intolerable were the situation reversed. Kant's approach
requires one to behave in accordance with rules of conduct equally
applicable to all, and precludes one from fashioning exceptions to
these rules for one's own actions.6
For legal educators and practitioners, Kant's theory provides a
framework for making professional practices more congruous with
moral norms. First, it affords a rational, impartial, and rigorously
principled form of reasoning which can identify moral values pre-
sent in contemporary practice situations. Second, having identified
relevant moral values, it requires that they be addressed when
resolving moral choices and formulating conduct. Third, it pro-
vides a means of formulating "universal" rules of conduct. Thus,
when faced with moral choices in practice, Kant's theory provides
a means by which lawyers can and should accept more responsibil-
ity for their actions, instead of seeking to avoid it by retreating
behind the professional role as encouraged by the autonomy
model. To be credible in the Kantian sense, professional actions
and judgments must be scrutinized to ensure that they provide a
basis for maxims which are consistent, dispassionate, universal
foundations for conduct.6 7
However, Kant's position can be too rigid. Kant argued that a
moral duty could not be transgressed even if obeying it would re-
sult in harm to others. His famous example was that a person
6 See generally Richards, Moral Theory, The Developmental Psychology of Ethical
Autonomy and Professionalism, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 359, 362 (1982). Richards' article is an
.interesting and sensitive exploration of the interdisciplinary relevance of moral philosophy
and developmental psychology to legal education, and especially to ethical reasoning. This is
a vast, as yet largely untapped, field that might prove to be very insightful.
" Mashaw, supra note 55, at 917 n.133 (citing J. RAWLS, supra note 56, at 11-22, 118-
92). Rawls' "original position" is a hypothetical situation he poses that "forms an initial
status quo from which a group of rational and mutually disinterested people reach a set of
agreements that provide the basis of a just society." Id. at 917 n. 132. "The veil of igno-
rance" is a condition Rawls imposes upon the participants in the original position; none of
them knows anything about him or herself, such as social status or natural abilities, that
could differentiate him or herself from the other participants." Id.
" ETHIICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 19 (T. Beauchamp & N. Bowie eds. 1979).
'7 See Rhode & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 643.
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could not tell a lie to a would-be murderer even if necessary to
save the life of another.68 Significantly, this example posits a con-
flict between the moral duty not to lie and the moral duty to pre-
vent harm to others.
W.D. Ross thus argued that moral conflicts can arise even in
deontological theory. Hence, "it is incoherent to insist upon uni-
versal validity of any one moral rule to the exclusion of all
others."69 Ross' approach of recognizing moral choices and con-
flicts, and then seeking to resolve them, better focuses deontologi-
cal theory for application to our world of uncertainty and difficult
choices. After all, we do not live in the universal kingdom of ends.
We live in the phenomenal world-the here and now of ordinary
reality-where many practical situations pose just the type of con-
flict of competing values that Ross hypothesized.
As previously argued, under the deontological model, moral
rules cannot be eclipsed by nonmoral considerations (e.g., client in-
terests or autonomy), but they may conflict with other moral
rules. 0 When such a conflict does exist, it becomes necessary to
critically analyze the situation so that it may be resolved in an
ethically satisfying manner.
Rawls characterized this approach as "intuitionism," a doc-
trine containing "an irreducible family of first principles which
have to be weighed against one another by asking ourselves which
balance . . . is the most just."" Under the Ross analysis, however,
a more direct moral philosophical reference remains. Ross' ap-
proach calls for the distribution of goods according to moral worth
(distributive justice). But, "while the principle to produce the most
good ranks as a first principle, it is but one such principle which
must be balanced by intuition against the claims of the other
prima facie principles. '"7 2 One other such prima facie principle rec-
"8 See D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 10, at 772. Professor D'Amato and I have previ-
ously noted Kant's example:
[An individual] who intends to murder your sister asking you if your sister is at
home. If in fact she is at home, Kant requires that you tell the truth and answer
in the affirmative. Later, pressed by his students, Kant further explained that if
you answer truthfully, the would-be murderer would probably not believe you!
Id. at n.35.
69 Id. at 773 (citing W. D. Ross, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1939); W. D. Ross, THE
RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930)).
70 See id. at 772-73.
71 J. RAwLs, supra note 56, at 34.
72 Id. at 40 (citing W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 21-27 (1930)).
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ognized by the deontological model is the preservation of attorney-
client confidentiality. Hence, one conflict to be resolved (through
intuition or intuitive reasoning) at this level of prima facie first
principles is the primacy of confidentiality in relation to other con-
crete moral claims, such as the duty to prevent harm to third
persons.
This raises, in rather direct fashion, what is known in moral
philosophy as the "priority problem." When presented with a con-
flict between competing moral claims, how does one provide a
"constructive answer . . . to the problem of assigning weights to
competing principles of justice[?] ''7 3 Ross again provides one an-
swer for the deontological model through a form of reasoning tech-
nically identified by Rawls as "lexicography."
Lexicography calls for a serial or lexical ordering of values. It
''requires us to satisfy the first principle in the ordering before we
can move on to the second, the second before we consider the
third, and so on."' 74 In this manner, Ross ranked moral worth as
lexically superior to nonmoral values, a classic example of lexico-
graphical reasoning in moral philosophy. 5
On this basis, the deontological model acknowledges that,
while moral rules clearly outweigh nonmoral claims, they may con-
flict with other moral rules. At this second level, the value of confi-
dentiality is juxtaposed with the moral duty to prevent harm to
others. The relevant deontological rules state:
(1) If A intends to harm B and the harm is serious either physi-
cally or financially, and if C discovers A's intention, then C is
charged with the ethical duty to act to prevent the harm to B,
such as by warning B; (2) any person is under a moral obligation
not to commit fraud or perjury, perjury being defined as a mate-
rial falsehood; (3) if C elicits information from A "in confidence,"
then unless there is a conflict with another moral obligation, C
has a duty to keep the information confidential; (4) there is a
moral value in some people becoming professional attorneys, so as
to give others access to the content of the law and access to in-
formed predictions about the probable behavior of officials. 6
The obvious danger in using a lexical ordering of values is that
73 Id.
11 Id. at 43.
7 See J. RAWLS, supra note 56, at 43 n.23 (citing W. D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD
149-54 (1930)).
7 D'Amato and Eberle, supra note 10, at 773.
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principled results may not be obtained by applying "intuitionism"
to the resolution of moral conflicts. There will always be a "plural-
ity of principles"' 7 which must be balanced when determining
which single principle in the plurality is "most just." This balanc-
ing will inevitably require the exercise of some discretion, but the
problem is not irreducible. Reliance on intuitionism can be re-
duced by substituting Rawls' prudential, rational judgment for
"unguided" moral judgment."8 Expressed in classical terms, pru-
dential judgment is what Aristotle called "practical judgment" or
"practical wisdom;" 9 what Kant termed "universal practical rea-
soning;"' 0 or, what contemporary constitutional and first amend-
ment theorists call "practical reason,"81 "prudence," "prudential
reasoning or judgment,""2 or "intuitionism. ' '8 3
The task then is one "of reducing and not of eliminating en-
tirely the reliance on intuitive judgments." 4 It is unrealistic to
think that all elements of discretion can be eliminated. Rather, the
"practical aim" is to "reach a reasonably reliable agreement" as to
ethical judgments.8 5 The broad ideal aim of legal ethics is to for-
mulate reasonable, consistent, and universal foundations for rules
of conduct. The practical aim is to reach results that are ethically
satisfactory, yet fair to the client. Kantian critical reasoning can go
a long way to reaching a workable solution to these problems. Ulti-
mately, however, even this deontological approach may at best
only be an "illuminating approximation" of what inevitably re-
mains a quest for more certain resolution.8
7 J. RAWLS, supra note 56, at 41.
78 Id. at 44.
79 See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. VI (M. Ostwald trans. 1962).
80 I. KANT, supra note 46, at 47.
11 See Farber, supra note 35, at 1334-35; Farber & Frickey, supra note 36, at 1639-56;
Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreward: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARV. L. REV. 4, 17-36 (1986).
82 Sagoff, The Limits of Justice, 92 YALE L.J. 1065, 1080-81 (1984).
83 See Schiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
1103, 1192-1215 (1983).
8 J. RAWLS, supra note 56, at 44.
85 Id.
88 Id. at 45. Indeed, I am trying to do nothing other than what Charles Fried percep-
tively recognized in his seminal article The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of
the Lawyer-Client Relation:
I do not imagine that what I have said provides an algorithm for resolving some of
these perennial difficulties. Rather, what I am proposing is a general way of look-
ing at the problem, a way of understanding not so much the difficult borderline
cases as the central and clear ones, in the hope that the principles we can there
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To summarize, the proposed model for critically reasoning
through ethical questions is as follows. When confronted with situ-
ations involving moral values, a person must critically evaluate the
factors at issue and must make a reasonable, disinterested assess-
ment of the situation utilizing the dynamic of Kantian critical rea-
soning in order to identify the moral values at issue. This is a type
of moral dialogue which can be characterized as an internal moral
dialogue. This can result in application of either of the lexico-
graphical rules. If a moral value conflicts with a nonmoral claim,
application of the first level lexicographical rule causes the moral
rule to prevail over nonmoral considerations. Thus, confidentiality
would outweigh other client interests of a nonmoral dimension, for
example, a corporate officer's desire to know the source of a confi-
dence placed with corporate counsel by a lower-level corporate em-
ployee. But if a moral rule conflicts with another moral rule, the
second level lexicographical rule applies, i.e., confidentiality versus
the duty to prevent harm. This means that individuals must then
make a moral choice of which value or values will provide a foun-
dation of principled justification upon which to base their actions.
This involves employing Ross' theory of going beyond identifying
the moral values at issue and recognizing the moral conflict in de-
ontological theory. One must then use a Rawlsian form of pruden-
tial judgment to resolve the conflict.
Put another way, having identified the moral conflict among
the first order of values, they must next be weighed to determine
which is most just or moral in the circumstances. Once a moral
choice is made in this manner, the lawyer is ready to enter into a
moral dialogue with the client. This can be characterized as an ex-
ternal moral dialogue, advice involving an open exchange of views
over all matters, values, and interests at issue (including moral val-
ues) designed to formulate principled conduct.
IV. APPLYING THE DEONTOLOGICAL MODEL
The core values of a deontological model of legal ethics have
discern will illuminate our necessarily approximate and prudential quest for reso-
lution on the borderline.
Fried, supra note 3, at 1087. In this way my process seems the reverse of Fried's. I am
engaged in a quest for more resolution on the borderline in the hope that this effort will
illuminate our quest for harmonization of practice norms with ethical principles, including
resolution of "central and clear" problems.
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previously been articulated.8 7 This section will apply the deonto-
logical model to contemporary practice situations and demonstrate
how the deontological view can better inculcate ethical considera-
tions into attorney-client deliberations. The examples involve chal-
lenges to the rule of confidentiality, still the most hotly debated
area of contemporary legal ethics and a good subject for demon-
strating the deontological approach. Here, the value of confidenti-
ality will be juxtaposed against countervailing moral values, in this
case the duty to warn innocent third parties of imminent harm.
One example deals with imminent and substantial physical harms,
while the other addresses similar economic harms. Both examples
are drawn from the world of practicing attorneys.
A. Imminent Physical Harm-Intent to Distribute Adulterated
Apples
1. Magnitude "4" Risk
Let us suppose that a lawyer represents Apple-Food Incorpo-
rated, a wholesale distributor of apples and apple products. It is
common practice for growers to apply a chemical additive to ap-
ples. This additive, chemical compound XYX, enhances the "red-
ness" of the apples, making the fruit more physically attractive to
consumers.
The problem with XYX is that recent in-house scientific stud-
ies seem to indicate that the substance causes cancer in laboratory
mice. The effects of XYX are especially pronounced in young mice,
leading scientists to hypothesize that the product is especially dan-
gerous to children. The potential threat is substantial since XYX
has been widely used, and apples are a staple of children's
diet-applesauce, juice, baby food, etc. However, the test results at
this stage are inconclusive. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 denoting
the least probability and 10 the greatest probability of a link to
cancer, the test results suggest a statistical probability of 4. More
tests have been ordered, but these results will not be available for
months. Apple-Food Inc. has already purchased this season's crop
87 See D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 10, at 773, 783-84, 787, 795-98. These core values
include: preservation of confidentiality in attorney-client relations; the duty to prevent
physical and financial harms to innocent third parties; providing access to the legal system;
the belief that lying, perjury, misrepresentation, fraud, and cheating are moral wrongs and
ultimately debilitating to the legal profession; and the questioning of allegiance to unjust
laws. Id.
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of apples, and quality control spot checks reveal that ninety per-
cent of the apples contain XYX. Company officials estimate the
value of these apples at one million dollars. Plans are underway to
distribute the product, since the apple season in which Apple-Food
makes most of its profits is at hand.
How should Apple-Food's lawyer advise the company? From
an autonomistic view, it is clear that the lawyer should assist in
maximizing the client's welfare. Apple-Food has made a significant
investment in its product, which it must sell in order to make
profit. As a professional, the lawyer has an obligation to educate
Apple-Food on the law so that Apple-Food knows the framework
in which it can maximize its interests; Apple-Food is entitled to
know its "rights."
But what is the law in this case? There is a suggestive but,
ultimately inconclusive, threat of harm which is difficult to assess.
Scientists' best estimate is that XYX poses a magnitude 4 threat
on the probability scale of causing cancer. The lawyer is obligated
to point out potential liability, probably in tort, in addition to ad-
vising Apple-Food of its rights, even though liability seems rela-
tively remote at this point. Intentional tortious conduct seems im-
probable since a "4" is not definite evidence of a present harm.
Even negligent conduct seems unlikely since a "reasonable" person
in this circumstance might conclude that a risk of 4 is a statisti-
cally less than probable event and, therefore, is too remote to jus-
tify any prophylactic measure. Thus, Apple-Food could distribute
the product within "manageable," and justifiable, risk proportions.
Moreover, no law or regulation prohibits the distribution of apples
in these circumstances. Accordingly, it seems proper to advise Ap-
ple-Food in good conscience that selling the apples is within its
legal rights.
However, law is not synonymous with morality."' A legal right
to do something does not make the act moral. A deontologist
would look to the moral concerns at issue, whether reflected in the
law or not. From a deontological perspective, the moral concern at
issue is the potential threat of harm to the apple-eating public, and
a deontologist would feel "obligated" to assess this threat. How-
ever, at this stage, the threat, while suggestive, is ultimately incon-
88 See id. at 778, 793-98; D'Amato, The Moral Dilemma of Positivism, 20 VAL. U.L.
REv. 43, 48 (1985); D'Amato, Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law, 26 AM. J. JuRis.
202, 206-10 (1981).
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clusive. Having conducted this "internal moral dialogue" by identi-
fying the moral values at issue-here, a threat of questionable
magnitude posed to the public by XYX-the lawyer must decide
whether it is necessary to make the moral choice to discuss the
moral value with the client. As I have argued, moral concerns
should be included in attorney-client discussions, where appropri-
ate, along with other important factors, such as client autonomy
interests, which include the client's rights under the law. 9
Assuming you made the moral choice to discuss the concerns
posed by XYX with your client, what would be the result of this
attorney-client dialogue? Summarily stated, the client interest in
making a profit would likely prevail over acting to address the
threat of harm, even though it is conceivable that some companies
would do everything possible to minimize the harm, and some
might go so far as to withhold the apples from distribution. Ulti-
mately, the decision is in the client's hands, where it belongs.
If the client decides to distribute the apples, should the lawyer
take any further action? Should an attorney breach confidentiality
and warn the public? In Ross' framework, this presents a conflict
in deontological theory. The moral conflict here is between main-
taining confidentiality and disclosing a potential harm in order to
protect innocent third parties. Both concerns are prima facie first
order moral values. Confidentiality has important moral value in
the deontological system, but is it outweighed by the threat of
harm to innocent third parties? In Rawlsian terms, the solution
can only be reached by determining which of these moral val-
ues-confidentiality or the duty to prevent harm-is "more just"
in these circumstances. This is not an easy question, and it forces
an analysis of the weight to be given to one set of moral concerns
over another, to ask, within the deontological framework, which
principle in the "plurality of principles" is "more just." Under the
11 The view that moral concerns are relevant to rendering legal advice has some support
in the codes. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE]. The Model Code states that "[i]n assisting his client to reach a proper deci-
sion, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to a decision
that is morally just as well as legally permissible." Id. The Model Rules provide that "[i]n
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."
MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 2.1 (1983). Implementation of this view in practice would
be consistent with what Lon Fuller has called a "morality of aspiration," as compared to the
"morality of duty" that marks obedience to most professional rules of conduct. L. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAw 5-6 (rev. ed. 1969).
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facts posed the lawyer should maintain confidentiality. Why?
Conscience might seem to indicate that even the threat of
harm should be disclosed. But this harm must also be evaluated in
order to formulate principled conduct. Here a magnitude 4 threat
of harm is suggestive but less than probable; it is ultimately indefi-
nite, unknowable, and by no means "concrete." It is likely that
quantifiably indefinite threats like this arise often in the food in-
dustry. On the other hand, the threat is inchoate; it could manifest
into a concrete imminent harm, but has not yet done so. Therefore,
a warning could be issued. Unfortunately, if warnings were dissem-
inated on this basis-that is, a quantifiably indefinite state of
knowledge-companies faced with threats which are manifestly
more concrete might find that their warnings in these circum-
stances lose persuasive force. Or, after issuing the warning, a com-
pany such as Apple-Food could suffer a precipitous drop in busi-
ness. Profits would then have been sacrificed for a perceived duty
to the public arising from a suggestive, but less than probable,
threat of harm. Apple-Food's duty to the public would, in effect,
have been determined to outweigh its duties to its stockholders,
employees, and community. This would clearly be an unacceptable
result in the autonomy model, but it might also be unacceptable in
the deontological model. These and other points are debatable.
Reasonable minds could differ, but without more "hard" data indi-
cating a greater statistical link to cancer this threat of harm is not
sufficiently concrete to outweigh the value of confidentiality in at-
torney-client relations, and the lawyer should therefore maintain
the confidence.
Can such conduct be justified? Does it provide the grounds for
a universal maxim? I think so. A responsible attorney would recog-
nize the need to confront and discuss with the client the moral
concerns at issue in this situation. The attorney would first assess
the moral value imbedded in the situation and then make a moral
choice about it. The consequences of this decision would then be
confronted and discussed frankly with the client. In terms of pro-
fessional responsibility, the attorney would have evaluated a rele-
vant moral concern in structuring advice, and then determined
whether to include that value as a factor on which to base the ad-
vice to be given to the client. In this example, the attorney has
determined to give advice based on this value. This is defensible
moral conduct. Reasonable minds may differ, but the maintenance
of secrecy is justifiable in this circumstance.
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Expressed as a Kantian rule of conduct, the attorney would
have decided that confidentiality is more important, is "more
just," than a countervailing duty to the public to prevent harm
when the harm is of a suggestive, but less than probable nature.
Having universalized this maxim, the attorney would be saying
that such action would be consistent with this universal rule in this
circumstance. The attorney also would be saying that others
should act in this manner when faced with a comparable problem.
Thus, the attorney would expect to be so treated by another attor-
ney in a similar situation, inasmuch as the personal interests of the
attorney and the interests of innocent third parties had been con-
sidered in determining what action to take.
2. Magnitude "8" Risk
Now let us change the hypothetical. Recent, more accurate
tests prove with certainty that what was merely suspected is now
true: XYX poses a definite threat of cancer particularly in chil-
dren. On a scale of 1 to 10, the probability of cancer developing is
now 8. This threat can be characterized as "highly probable." The
moral concern is now clear: innocent people will likely be harmed
by eating Apple-Food's apples. The lawyer recognizes the greater
magnitude of the threat as well as the increased moral value in
preventing harm. This is one of several factors which you discuss
with your client in the process of rendering advice. There is still no
immediate legal impediment to distribution of the apples in the
sense of any positive law or regulation prohibiting dissemination in
these circumstances. But now there is clearly potential, even prob-
able, tort liability-on grounds of negligence, dissemination of an
inherently dangerous product, and possibly intentional infliction of
emotional distress, among other possible theories. The lawyer
points all of this out, as required under any model of legal ethics.
The lawyer also notes that, while these potential tort liabilities
are probable, they are not one-hundred percent certain to occur.
Eating these apples merely increases the statistical risk that cancer
may develop. Moreover, even if a consumer of Apple-Food's apples
develops cancer, how can it be definitively linked to ingesting these
particular apples? Could not cancer just as well arise from eating
other food products (bacon, sausage, or saccharin), or from the en-
vironment (benzene, PCB's, asbestos, or other carcinogens present
in the air, water, or earth), or simply by being a member of modern
society (passive inhalation of cigarette smoke, x-rays, radon, etc.)?
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How can eating these apples be proven to be the proximate cause
of the disease? Even if these apples are the scientific proximate
cause of the disease, plaintiffs would have a significant, possibly
insurmountable, burden to prove that ingesting these apples is the
legal proximate cause of the harm.
Officials of Apple-Food respond that they will nevertheless go
forward with distribution of the apples. Too much money has al-
ready been invested and they need to make a profit. Otherwise, the
company's fortunes may suffer, leaving company employees, in-
cluding the lawyer, out of a job. Besides, there is nothing illegal in
their proposed conduct; no positive or common law principle "pre-
vents" them from distributing the apples at this time. While they
regret the harms that may arise, these harms do not appear to be
imminent in the sense of causing harm to this quarter's profit and
loss statement, or even the annual results. Nor do they seem one
hundred percent certain to arise in any event. After all, cancer may
not actually develop from these apples, and even if it does, the
apples may not be proven to be the legal proximate cause of the
disease. Therefore, even under prevailing tort principles, Apple-
Food's proposed conduct may not ultimately result in liability.
Apple-Food officials concede the propriety of the lawyer's
warning of potential liability for which they wish to be prepared.
Thus, they propose to set aside ten percent of profits per year, in-
vested at ten percent per annum, as a reserve against potential
claims.90
The lawyer has now raised the relevant moral concerns, but
they have been transformed into a quantifiable dollars and cents
figure. The transaction costs of doing business in potentially carci-
nogenic apples, even in the face of potential legal liability, have
been assessed and quantified in an autonomy model calculus of cli-
90 Such hard-boiled economic valuation of life does go on in the real world, as the Ford
Pinto cases demonstrate. Stewart McCauley noted that "[p]erhaps the most dramatic reac-
tion to a manufacturer's judgments about the value of human suffering and death involved
the Ford Pinto." McCaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
115, 157 n.6 (1979). In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr.
348 (1981), a 13-year-old boy suffered severe burns when a Ford Pinto's gas tank ruptured
and ignited. Id. at 773, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 359. The jury was shown a memorandum in which
Ford considered installing a check-valve on its fuel tanks to increase their safety. Id. at 776,
174 Cal. Rptr. at 361. The authors of the memorandum stated that if the valves were not
installed, there would be a significant risk of death or injury due to fire which could be
avoided at nominal ($11) cost. Id. at 777, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 361. Management concluded that
the benefits to be anticipated did not outweigh the cost. Id.
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ent interests and determined to be less than the costs of halting
distribution of the apples. Economically, it is in Apple-Food's best
interest to continue business as usual and distribute the product;
essentially the law is being stretched to accommodate the self-in-
terest of the client. Law is being viewed here through modern legal
realist lenses as non-normative and therefore "breakable" so long
as the costs of transgression are paid. In this instance, the transac-
tion costs of transgression are still less than the compliance costs
of the "law," and so it makes economic sense to proceed in this
manner.
In these circumstances, a deontologist would disclose the
threat of harm to the public if such were the only way to prevent
potential injury to consumers. The increase in statistical propen-
sity of harm from 4 to 8 crosses the danger line, making "choate"
the threat of harm, and, therefore, triggers a corresponding need to
respond more directly to the harm out of a sense of moral respon-
sibility by, for example, warning the public. Any warning to the
public should of course be done in a manner which is least prejudi-
cial to the client. 1 The substantial and imminent harm posed by
carcinogenic apples is too important to be outweighed by confiden-
tiality. This would be the "more just" solution in the deontological
model.
In these circumstances, an attorney should have the discretion
to disclose. "Indeed, despite the impression that a deontological
model of legal ethics would mandate the disclosure in order to pre-
vent harm," Professor D'Amato and I have argued that "the deon-
tological model of legal ethics should only allow, but not require,
the attorney to reveal the confidence."92 By permitting the attor-
ney to reveal the confidence and disclose the harm, the deontologi-
cal model would simply remove any professional barrier that bars
disclosure. Thus, there would be no professional reason why the
attorney could not disclose the harm. The ethical dimensions of
the attorney's decision would then have to be confronted by the
11 I am arguing here only that this confidence-the possibility of harm posed by
XYX-should be disclosed if that is the only way to prevent its occurrence. Notwithstand-
ing disclosure of this confidence, the lawyer still has other fiduciary and confidentiality obli-
gations vis-d-vis the client, Apple-Food. These obligations include, at a minimum, nondis-
closure of any information other than what is necessary to address the threat of harm here
at issue and, even assuming disclosure of this confidence, disclosure of it in a manner that is
least prejudicial to Apple-Food. How to so disclose this confidence to accomplish these goals
is a subject for another article.
" D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 10, at 776.
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attorney not as a professional, but as a member of society. 3 The
attorney's moral autonomy would be equal to that of others. In the
hypothetical posed, any person would ordinarily have a moral obli-
gation to make the disclosure to prevent harm to innocent third
parties.
Is it justifiable not to disclose? Would nondisclosure form the
basis for a universal maxim, for forming a generalizable rule of
conduct? Application of a deontological analysis makes the an-
swers to these questions self-evident. Would the attorney want to
be treated this way as a member of the general public? Would the
attorney want his children to be treated this way? What if the cli-
ent was the neighborhood farmer and not a multi-million dollar
business? It is fair to say that the vast majority of people, includ-
ing Kant, would not regard nondisclosure in this case as being in
the realm of universal law-making. Rather, the universal rule, in a
Kantian sense, would be that confidentiality must be overridden
when disclosure of the threat of an imminent, concrete, substan-
tial, physical harm is the only way to prevent the harm. Here, the
duty to prevent harm is "more just" than the maintenance of
confidentiality.
B. Intent to Commit Economic Harm-Securities Harm
1. Harm Without Fraud
Now contrast the results reached in the above scenarios, in-
volving threats of physical harm, to a situation involving the intent
to commit an economic harm. The example I will use is one of the
most pervasive phenomenons of the bullish 1980s: the hostile take-
overs.
Suppose you represent Jovan, a premier take-over "artist." He
has his sights set on ABC Company, a well run medium-sized man-
ufacturer of dairy products. ABC is run by John McFeely, who
started the company from scratch and has put his heart and soul
into the business. ABC is the anchor of the community. Genera-
tions have been employed there and it is a good place to work.
McFeely pays a good wage and provides excellent benefits in re-
turn for which he gets good labor. He believes in giving back to the
community.
ABC is vulnerable right now, however. Cash reserves are down
11 See id.
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because McFeely has poured significant funds into research and
development ("R & D"), as is his custom, and has made several
needed but expensive capital improvements. Also, ABC's wage and
benefit structure is not cheap. All of this has had the effect of de-
pressing the price of ABC's stock, which is freely traded over the
counter. In short, ABC seems like a bargain to those interested in
investing in its stock.
Jovan has had his sights on ABC for some time. He already
owns an empire of food-related companies and ABC's product line
would complement these companies. Upon acquiring ABC, Jovan
will sell its units piecemeal while fitting the remainder within his
existing product line. Should Jovan fail to acquire ABC, he will
nevertheless make a tidy profit through greenmail.94 Financing the
take-over will not be a problem. Jovan has unlimited funds availa-
ble through junk-bond financing, his standard funding source.
Jovan has successfully used this strategy to build Jovan Consoli-
dated. Under any scenario, he figures to "win."
In the strategy sessions in which the attorney has participated,
everyone agrees that ABC is doomed to succumb to Jovan's strat-
egy. The options available to ABC are not attractive. If ABC de-
cides to fight the take-over, it will be able to do so only at a heavy
cost. Money must be raised to buy back stock. Thus, assets will
have to be sold, employee benefits slashed, R & D halted, and peo-
ple will lose jobs. Even if ABC "wins" the battle, the company will
become a shadow of its former self, probably vulnerable to another
take-over attack, or worse. If Jovan wins, the results will be the
same; that is, money will be needed to service ABC's acquisition
debt, so assets will then have to be sold, employee benefits slashed,
R & D halted, and people will lose jobs. What remains of ABC will
then become part of Jovan Consolidated. Under any scenario, the
personal and economic cost to McFeely and ABC will be severe:
they face ruin personally, professionally, and economically, al-
though ABC stockholders stand to profit financially, at least in the
short term.
How should the attorney advise Jovan? Under the prevailing
autonomy model, the attorney has an obligation to assist Jovan in
maximizing his welfare. This is easy: Jovan must simply comply
9 In the general scenario, in order to get rid of Jovan, ABC will buy out Jovan's stock
at a price profitable to him. See generally Gilson, Drafting an Effective Greenmail Prohibi-
tion, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 329 (1988) (discussing how current prohibitions fail to control
greenmail).
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with the securities laws. Once his ownership interest in ABC rises
above five percent, he must promptly file the appropriate reports
with the SEC. During the take-over he must be careful to dissem-
mate promptly and accurately any material information. The rest
will take care of itself; the forces of the marketplace will come into
play and Jovan will triumph.
Does this scenario present any moral concerns? There is of
course the threat of imminent and substantial economic harm to
McFeely and ABC. But the Model Rules make a strong distinction
between physical and financial harm, recognizing certain obliga-
tions to others for physical, but not financial, harms 5 Professor
D'Amato and I previously argued that economic harm can be as
ruinous as physical harm: a person could be deprived of essential
shelter or nutrition that could have serious health consequences.9"
Thus, a deontologist would recognize the threat of economic harm
as a moral concern and, accordingly, perceive an obligation to dis-
cuss this concern with Jovan. But Jovan's response is predictable:
McFeely and ABC are simply other players in the marketplace. All
are subject to the mores of the market, and that means that some
must "lose" in order that others may "win." Viewed in this way,
McFeely and ABC possess acquisition value that can be quantified
in dollars and cents. Jovan simply has to pay the going price and
ABC is his. Besides, Jovan thinks he can then use the ABC assets
more efficiently, and thus the acquisition may better serve society's
interests in the long run.
Not having succeeded in moderating Jovan's conduct in this
" See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6(b)(1). Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) allows a lawyer
to "reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result
in imminent death or substantial bodily harm." Id. The Final Draft of the Model Rules
contained an exception to confidentiality that allowed disclosure for threats of financial
harm. Disclosure was allowed "to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudu-
lent act that the lawyer believe[d] [was] likely to result in bodily harm, or substantial injury
to the financial interest or property of another." See id. (as finally submitted by the Kutak
Commission in 1981) (emphasis added). This version of the Final Draft was very controver-
sial and ultimately voted down by the ABA, which adopted the former version.
The Model Code provision is more ambiguous, but would probably support disclosure
necessary to prevent an economic crime: "A lawyer may reveal . . . [t]he intention of his
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime." MODEL CODE,
supra note 89, DR 4-101(C)(3). The outcome here would depend on case law development of
the "crimes" which one could disclose.
9' See D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 10, at 791. Indeed, when Frank Lorenzo acquired
one of his first big prizes in a hostile take-over, Continental Airlines, the then-President of
Continental shut the door to his office after closing the deal and killed himself.
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external moral dialogue, is the attorney now faced with a moral
dilemma of whether to breach confidentiality and disclose the
harm? Not really. There is, in fact, a moral concern in the threat of
harm to ABC and its constituents. After all, they face personal and
economic ruin. Yet, in the broader context of our market economy
Jovan is right: ABC is merely another player. It is subject to the
vicissitudes of the marketplace. You may or may not agree with
Jovan's aims, as you may not agree with any client's aims, but he is
committing no moral or legal wrong. Concern for ABC, however
heartfelt, does not prevail over the value of confidentiality in this
situation.
Applying Ross' first order lexicographical rule, confidentiality,
a prima facie first order moral value trumps nonmoral considera-
tions-in this case, the economic consequences to ABC and its con-
stituents if they are viewed as other players subject to the mores of
the marketplace. Even assuming that this harm that is about to
affect ABC and its constituents is viewed as having moral value,
Ross' second order lexicographical rule would apply. Summarily
stated, confidentiality would be determined to be "more just" than
the economic harm because the economic harm, though significant,
has been brought about through legal and moral means. This has
occurred in a setting which can be viewed as "essentially fair," in
that risk and opportunity are available in an arguably equal man-
ner to all who chose to play by market rules. Analysis under either
lexical rule suggests that maintenance of confidentiality would be
principled conduct under a deontological model, as it would be
under the autonomy model, although the same result ensues for
different reasons.
One might think that, out of concern for ABC and the ABC
community, a lawyer operating under a socialist model of legal eth-
ics would be inclined to disclose in these circumstances. 97 On the
other hand, a lawyer might be persuaded by the Chicago school
view of economic efficiency and conclude that state interests would
best be served by Jovan's control of ABC assets since this would
91 Professor D'Amato and I have previously argued that law in a socialist society is an
expedient designed to carry out state objectives, and is evaluated from the standpoint of its
utility in serving state and public interests. Thus, the lawyer's objective is to help conform
the client's conduct to desirable state objectives. See id. at 770-71. The probable state objec-
tive here is the preservation of ABC as an employer of workers from the ABC community.
This goal would likely take precedence over the more narrow economic self-interest of
Jovan, unless of course Jovan's economic self-interest was viewed as serving society's eco-
nomic self-interest.
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maximize social wealth.9" In this view, a socialist state law is sim-
ply an expediency to carry out state objectives, whatever form
those objectives take from time to time, or even day to day.
2. Harm With Fraud
Once again, let us change the hypothetical. Jovan has obtained
his information about ABC's vulnerability from an inside network
of informants-other lawyers, accountants, stock analysts, etc.
Jovan is trading on "inside" information. In fact, he has built his
empire on this type of fraud, though his past frauds are not our
present concern. Having obtained information that ABC considers
to be "confidential" and proprietary, Jovan now desires to use this
inside information to his advantage by trading on ABC stock
before the inside information becomes publicly available. He views
this scheme as a method better to assure the success of his strat-
egy, even though he recognizes that his strategy might succeed
even under normal market conditions. In calculating his interests,
Jovan has placed a low probability factor on the likelihood of his
being caught. Simply put, he is interested in maximizing the likeli-
hood of his acquiring ABC, and therefore views "insider trading"
as a tolerable risk and the most expedient means of realizing his
objective.
Now how should Jovan be advised? Of course, the attorney
now has pressing legal concerns. Jovan is clearly violating securi-
ties laws and faces potential punishment, even imprisonment, if he
is caught and found guilty. The attorney is obligated as a profes-
sional to point this out. But Jovan believes that he can successfully
evade the law, and pull off his scheme with impunity, and he is not
dissuaded by legal impediments posed by the securities laws.
The moral concerns present here are also now more clearly
drawn. The threat of imminent financial harm to ABC is still the
same. But the means for bringing about that harm are no longer
legal or moral; they are fraudulent, which is a legal and moral
wrong. They have no place in our market economy, nor in our code
" See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1977); Easterbrook &
Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985); Easterbrook &
Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1165-68 (1981); Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflec-
tions on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913, 915-
21 (1982); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and
the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1, 42 (1978).
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of professional conduct."
Fraud is clearly a legal wrong,100 but why is it a moral wrong?
Professor D'Amato and I have already concluded that the deonto-
logical model mandates that all persons are under a moral obliga-
tion not to commit fraud (or perjury),'01 but why is this so? Funda-
mentally, it is because fraud involves some type of deliberate
misrepresentation of fact, which is the data that comprises our
phenomenal world. Fraud is thus deceit, a deliberate propagation
of a falsehood on another.
A simple example of fraud is the one already posed: the mis-
representation of a material fact to obtain a needed loan, even if
that loan is to be used for a "good" purpose.102 But while it seems
"intuitively" obvious that such "common law" types of fraud are
morally as well as legally wrong, why would "insider trading" be a
fraud of moral dimension? After all, some believe use of inside in-
formation is acceptable conduct in our market system. 03
Insider trading does not seem to involve the type of direct de-
ception that the above common law examples pose.0 4 The insider
is not asserting an untrue fact or failing to assert a material fact to
get a loan or to achieve any other objective; or is he? The explana-
tion lies partly in the structure of the market, and the rules that
govern it. The explanation also lies partly in the conduct itself.
Turning first to the market structure, federal securities laws
that govern the trading of securities emerged from the aftermath
of the 1929 market crash and are designed to provide investors
with full disclosure of material information concerning securities.
The purpose of these laws is to protect investors against fraud and
manipulation of stock prices and to promote "ethical" standards of
99 See MODEL CODE, supra note 89, DR 7-102(A)(7) ("In his representation of a client a
lawyer shall not . . . [c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be
illegal or fraudulent").
100 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §10(b), 15 U.S.C. §78(b) (1988); see SEC v. Texas
Gulph Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
101 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
103 See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET: A SUGGESTION FOR RE-
PLACING THE DOCTRINE OF PRIVITY (1966); Comment, Civil Liability Under Section lOB and
Rule 1OB-5, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 675-76 (1965).
104 However, insider trading is common law fraud and not a statutory violation. See
Comment, Securities Regulation-Newspaper Reporter's Trading on Basis of Misappropri-
ated Prepublication Information as Rule 10b-5 Violation-United States v. Carpenter, 60
TEMP. L.Q. 215, 226 (1987).
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honesty and fair dealing, 10 5 not unlike rules of legal ethics. These
rules were set up to guarantee an essentially fair market frame-
work for exchanging securities by parties with essentially equal ac-
cess to information, the key resource of the market. In other words,
the laws are designed to make market conditions the same for all
players, and all expect and are expected to play by these rules.
But what if you do not want to play by these rules; what if
someone, like Jovan, wishes to trade on inside information? Of
course this harms the "integrity" of the market, but does it involve
moral impropriety; does it harm the person's integrity? I think it
does.
Anyone engaging in insider trading intends to deceive, manip-
ulate, and defraud others-either target companies or other inves-
tors-by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities
so that he may profit to their disadvantage. By manipulating the
price of stock and thereby profiting, he is clearly using "immoral"
means (manipulation, deceit, misrepresentation, etc.) to accom-
plish an arguably amoral or moral end, profit. Immoral conduct
can result from either the pursuit of amoral or moral ends by im-
moral means or immoral ends by amoral or moral means. Thus,
insider trading is at least the pursuit of amoral or moral ends by
immoral means and is therefore immoral conduct. This analysis
leads to the conclusion that insider trading is both legally and
morally wrong.
Returning to the hypothetical, the responsible attorney feels
obligated, of course, to discuss with Jovan the legal and moral im-
propriety of fraud and its potentially dire consequences for ABC,
and, if it comes to light, for Jovan. But he is not deterred by these
legal or moral arguments. The die is cast. There is a clear conflict
among first order prima facie moral values-between confidential-
ity to the client and the threat of imminent and substantial eco-
nomic harm to innocent third parties. Now what?
In this situation, an autonomist would not breach confidential-
ity and disclose the harm. The attorney might not personally agree
with the client's decision, but would still abide by it. Confidential-
ity has a very high, nearly insurmountable value in the autonomy
model,'06 and an autonomist would be supported by the codes of
105 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (discussing Securities Act
of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
10' D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 10, at 775-76, 790-91.
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professional responsibility.'" °
A deontologist would have a sharply different view. The intent
to commit serious economic harm through fraud would morally
outweigh the value of confidentiality. This means that the attorney
would have the discretion to disclose in the manner described
above. However, the attorney would not be shielded from the ethi-
cal responsibility of facing the consequences of the judgments and
actions decided upon, and instead would face the moral choice as a
non-lawyer would.
Even though fraud is a moral wrong, perhaps not all financial
fraud would or should outweigh confidentiality. This necessitates a
second level serial rule analysis where one moral rule conflicts with
another moral rule. Each moral rule (the duty to prevent harm
through fraud and the duty to maintain confidentiality) would
have to be individually assessed. The fraud would have to be as-
sessed critically, accounting for the degree of harm which it poses,
to determine if it is "serious" or "substantial." The problem is sim-
ilar to assessing physical harm under the Model Rules, which seem
to predicate discretionary disclosure of confidences on "imminent
death or substantial bodily harm." The result as to which moral
107 See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6 (1981); AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE, supra
note 1, Alternative A, Rules 1.1-1.6, Alternative B, Rules 1.1-1.4. (The Roscoe
Pound-American Trial Law. Found., Comm'n on Professional Responsibility, Discussion
Draft, 1980). Although all drafts of the Model Rules up to the final document contained an
intended fraud exception to confidentiality, the Revised Final Draft omitted that exception.
Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6(b)(2) (Proposed Final Draft 1981) with Rule
1.6(b)(1) (Revised Final Draft 1982); see also D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 10, at 790-91
(discussing question of intended fraud exception in Model Rules). Resolution of this issue
under the Model Code is more ambiguous. See supra note 95.
Were this an after-the-fact question, then DR 7-102(B)(1) would apply. This rule pro-
vides that:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal, he shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and
if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication.
MODEL CODE, supra note 89, DR 7-102(B)(1) (emphasis added). Assuming again the after-
the-fact nature of the situation, DR 7-102(B)(1) would call for the attorney to reveal the
"fraud upon a person"-here the securities fraud-if the form of this rule in effect is that
which existed before the 1974 Amendment, which added the privileged communications ex-
ception. If the post-1974 form of the rule were in effect, assuming a privileged communica-
tion was the basis of his knowledge, the lawyer could not disclose the fraud. The exception
would essentially swallow the rule. The Model Rules have no provision comparable to DR 7-
102(B)(1), thus further evidencing the ABA's retreat from removing moral concerns from
confidentiality rules.
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value should predominate can only be obtained by applying some
forms of prudential judgment in the manner described above.
It would provide more guidance if ethical rules could be based
on terms more specific than "serious," "substantial," or "immi-
nent." But perhaps this is not possible. For us, therefore, the prac-
tical aim is to reach a reasonably reliable agreement over ethical
standards and judgments; in short, an illuminating
approximation.' 8
Under the deontological model, Jovan's intent to commit fi-
nancial fraud has been "reasonably" determined to be "substan-
tial" and therefore poses a "serious" or "substantial" moral con-
cern. Thus, in this case a deontologist would put Jovan on notice
that disclosure of the intended harm would be compelled if Jovan
did not desist from this conduct and no other means of prevention
were available. The attorney should also refrain from any further
involvement in the matter. In the deontological world, an attorney
cannot be a party to, nor acquiesce in, fraud." 9
Is the autonomist view justifiable? Does it provide the basis
for a universal maxim? Not if conventional morality is to play a
role in contemporary professional responsibility. Would you want
to be treated as McFeely or an ABC employee? Would you want
your brother, sister, son, or daughter to be so treated? Would you
be as apt to maintain confidentiality if you did not get repeat busi-
ness from Jovan worth millions? It seems clear that the autonomist
view does not result in principled conduct under this form of
analysis.
Few people would ordinarily subscribe to a maxim that man-
dates maintenance of confidentiality in the face of an imminent
threat of serious economic harm brought about through fraud.
Fraud-a moral and legal wrong-cannot displace the concrete
moral rule to prevent harm to innocent third parties even when
that fraud might be viewed as shielded by the moral claim of confi-
dentiality. To conclude otherwise is to value confidentiality over
this and probably most, if not all, other moral values. It is to allow
confidentiality to trump all other concerns; thus, confidentiality
would, and does, operate to "shield" moral vision.
Few of us would ascribe such an exalted position to confidenti-
ality in formulating ethical rules. While this certainly would lead
'08 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
I'l See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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to a "simplified" moral (or amoral) universe, n ° it would not reflect
the "reality" of our diverse, disparate, contrary world. Thus, the
better, and more realistic Kantian maxim would be that confiden-
tiality must be outweighed by the disclosure of imminent, concrete,
substantial economic harms committed through fraud if disclosure
is the only way to prevent the harm.
V. WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE AUTONOMY MODEL?
The autonomy model is justifiable only if there is a profes-
sional reason for the kind of conduct suggested in the above hy-
potheticals. Many argue that the amoral technical role of the law-
yer promotes worthwhile, and some think moral, goals of
individual autonomy, dignity, and equality.'I Further, by promot-
ing these goals, societal interests are served as well. In a perfectly
just society, where everyone has essentially equal access to re-
sources and the ability to use them, where one person's autonomy
would be limited only by that of another, and this dynamic of op-
posing forces always remains in equilibrium, this argument might
make more sense. Perhaps it would apply in Kant's universal king-
dom of ends or Rawls' original position. Almost everyone agrees
that the autonomy model essentially makes sense in the context of
the criminal adversary system, where the system is structured so
that the defendant is entitled to a well-spirited and zealous de-
fense in countering the resources of the state, and the contest is
mediated and ultimately decided by a neutral decision-maker.
In these situations, and perhaps others, an attorney zealously
representing a client seems justified in deferring most moral con-
siderations because the system, viewed idealistically, presupposes
that justice will prevail through an essentially equal battle of con-
testants. The attorney must perform the "amoral" role of zealous
advocate in order to promote justice. It seems justifiable then to
place moral responsibility with the system, and not the individual
attorney."2
110 See Wasserstrom, supra note 8, at 8. "In this way, the lawyer as professional comes
to inhabit a simplified universe which is strikingly amoral-which regards as morally irrele-
vant any number of factors which nonprofessional citizens might take to be important, if
not decisive, in their everyday lives." Id.
"' See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 9-23; Fried, supra note 3, at 1066, 1073-78; Pep-
per, supra note 3, at 616-19.
12 See Bean, A Proposal for the Moral Practice of Law, 12 J. LEGAL PROF. 49, 54
(1987).
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Unfortunately, our society is not perfectly just; it may not
even be "more just" than another. Most contemporary practice sit-
uations do not involve cases where essentially equal contestants do
battle within a pre-arranged set of rules that ultimately are arbi-
trated by a neutral judge. This rarely occurs in the private law
model that I have hypothesized, where social status and economic
resources, among other factors, can frequently determine out-
comes. In these situations-the context of most legal prac-
tice-there is no good reason for abdicating personal moral respon-
sibility for actions committed as a professional.
The problem with the autonomy model with which I have
been concerned is its tendency to undervalue, if not submerge,
moral concerns that may be relevant to structuring legal advice
and conduct. The autonomy model suggests that we as profession-
als should place our skill, guile, and resources for hire, but not our
conscience. Our conscience seems instead consigned to placement
in a kind of blind trust-to be used only when our professional role
ends. Autonomists would have us put our skills to work zealously
to serve client ends without considering those ends, the means
used to accomplish those ends, or even our own conduct in promot-
ing those ends or means on behalf of others as "special-purpose
friends." 113 We should apply our skills as functionaries, or techni-
cians, to do things that might embarrass or shame us as private
persons. Unfortunately, this means that we have allowed cli-
ents-client autonomy interests-to circumscribe our own moral
autonomy.
If the autonomy model was viewed as an ethical model, most
philosophers would see it as "holding that the good of the individ-
ual, as defined by the individual, is the paramount goal.""' 4 In
philosophical terms this would be called "egoism" or "egotism."
Many philosophers would agree that egotism, a philosophy "that
allows unrestrained behavior by any individual[,] cannot be called
'moral.' ,115 Egotism is not moral because "everyone is permitted
to advance his interests as he pleases."" 6 Inevitably, if "wealth,
position and influence, and the accolades of social prestige, are a
person's final purposes," then "force and cunning" will determine
113 See Fried, supra note 3, at 1071.
.1. See D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 10, at 798.
115 Id.
"I J. RAWLS, supra note 56, at 124.
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outcomes.1 17 Egotism is what we are "stuck with" if we are "unable
to reach an understanding" as to fundamental moral concerns. 118
"We have concluded that surrogate egotism, in which one person
acts on behalf of another's unbridled egotism, constitutes the 'au-
tonomy' model of professional responsibility." 19
Because of this moral deficiency in the autonomy model, I
contend that outside the criminal adversary context, where moral
conflicts arise in private law practice, there must be room for attor-
ney moral autonomy which I have described as deontological. In
these situations there should be no professional reason why law-
yers should be shielded, or shield themselves, from ethical deci-
sion-making. Lawyers should confront the normative dimension of
their professional lives, as other members of society must, and as
lawyers must beyond their professional roles. After all, lawyers as
individuals are ends too, not just means or functionaries. To realize
a lawyer's own moral autonomy means that he must consider the
purposes and ends of his judgments, actions, and services. I con-
tend, simply, that a place should exist for this dimension of re-
sponsible, ethical lawyering in a capitalist context.
VI. A PROPOSAL TO CODIFY THE DEONTOLOGIcAL APPROACH
It is no mean feat at this stage in the evolution of professional
responsibility theory to codify a deontological approach to a pro-
fessional rule of confidentiality. The work has already been essen-
tially done by the drafters of the Model Rules, whose proposed
draft provided that confidentiality should be maintained except
when a lawyer reasonably believes it necessary to reveal
information:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal or (inten-
tional or) fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or in substan-
tial injury to the financial interests or property of another;
(2) to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal, (intentional)
or fraudulent act [of the type described in 1.6(b)(1)]in the fur-
therance of which the lawyer's services had been used.120
This rule would encompass all the foregoing hypotheticals
i,1 Id. at 129, 136.
1"I Id. at 136.
118 See D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 10, at 798.
120 MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1983).
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here discussed. Were this proposed version enacted as the profes-
sional rule of confidentiality, our code of ethics would "recapitulate
the requirements of morality in its exceptions to the confidential-
ity principle."'' Clients would then be on notice that confidential-
ity can be limited by other moral norms. Lawyers acting on moral
considerations would then also have stronger legal support for jus-
tifying their actions as professionals.'22 This would be one way of
bringing current professional practices into better congruity with
morality.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, of course, the question of moral responsibility in
lawyering is one for the professional bar, and, more broadly, soci-
ety. Everyone has a stake in justice and morality. Efforts like this
can only point the way. Although one epic battle has been con-
tested, can anyone say this debate is over?
121 D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 10, at 776-77.
122 The practical ramifications of a rule of confidentiality that allows lawyers to "blow
the whistle" out of a sense of moral responsibility, but then suffer the repercussions of their
actions by being fired, is a very serious matter for the bar, and all professions. That problem
is important and serious, but unfortunately beyond the scope of this article.
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